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This thesis seeks to analyze the protection of human rights relating to sexual and 
gender-based discrimination and torture through the development of international criminal 
law. It seeks to do so by looking at the work of the Office of the Prosecutor and examining 
how it has approached sexual and gender-based violence crimes in its charging strategies. It 
will scrutinize relevant considerations as to why these strategies were adopted, and the 
outcomes that materialized by using such strategies.  
Specifically, the thesis looks to compare and contrast the criminal charges brought 
against Bemba and Lubanga. These cases contained evidence of sexual violence against 
specific communities within the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African 
Republic. The thesis aims to determine in what ways such prosecutorial strategies have 
ensured justice for these human rights violations; both with regards to holding perpetrators 
accountable and also with regards to prioritizing the safety and protection of the victims. 
Throughout the thesis, the author will discuss the development of international protections 
against sexual and gender-based violence, specifically through the development of 
international criminal law and the corresponding international tribunals and mechanisms 
established to enforce such law.   
Finally, the thesis will determine which strategy can be considered the most successful 
for achieving gender justice, and recommends how the Office of the Prosecutor might 
approach future cases with a sexual and gender-based violence element. It also considers how 
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Historical and Current Context 
It has become increasingly acknowledged that rape and sexual crimes are not only viewed 
as a spoil of war by combatants in conflict, but have in fact ‘always been a fundamental and 
accepted military tactic’.1 Despite this recognition, gender-based violence continues to occur 
even in current conflicts today. This is no doubt due in large part to the extremely slow 
development of social perceptions of and legal protections against sexual and gender-based 
violence (SGBV) over the past century; the lack of extensive coverage in the Hague 
Conventions and Regulations of 1907, the Nuremberg Charter, and the 4th Geneva Convention 
of 1949 are testament to this.2  
Research surrounding the intersection between international criminal law and sexual and 
gender-based violence (SGBV) has become increasingly prevalent in recent times due to the 
developing, albeit delayed, perceptions of firstly what constitutes a sexual or gender-based 
violence crime, combined with the increasing recognition of the severity of these crimes. Their 
prolific occurrence in numerous countries such as in the 1990s in the Former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda, along with a variety of African nations such as Uganda and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo more recently, and in the ongoing Syrian conflict, has led to increased alarm 
regarding their wide occurrence and damaging effects and have given the international 
community the impetus to finally further regulate their occurrence.3 Thus, more recently, we 
 
1 Rhonda Copelon, “Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against Women into International 
Criminal Law,” McGill Law Journal 46 (2000) 220; Brook Sari Moshan, “Women, War and Words: The 
Gender Component in the Permanent International Criminal Court’s Definition of Crimes Against Humanity,” 
Fordham International Law Journal (1998) 157. 
2 International Conferences (The Hague), “Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land,” (October 18, 1907); 
United Nations, “Charter of the International Military Tribunal – Annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution 
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement),” (August 8, 1945); 
Article 27 “Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War ,” (Geneva, August 
12, 1949). 
3 Ludovica Poli, “Criminalising Rape and Sexual Violence as Methods of Warfare,” in Fausto Pocar, Marco 
Pedrazzi, Micaela Frulli, War Crimes and the Conduct of Hostilities: Challenges to Adjudication and 
Investigation, (Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013) 143; Helen Liebling, “Conflict and Postconflict 
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have seen the prosecution of SGBV at the ad hoc tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda and their codification within the Rome Statute; the statute aims to ‘put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes’ and ensure that ‘their effective prosecution [is] 
ensured.’4  
The commission of sexual and gender-based violence is a violation of many human rights 
provisions. It is a breach of the ‘right to life, liberty and security’ of any person (male or female) 
as noted by Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Articles 6 
and 9 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).5 It is a violation 
of the right to ‘enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ 
under Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.6 From 
a gendered perspective, it is also a violation of the Convention on All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) which was noted to include protections against SGBV under 
General Recommendation 19.7 Indeed the Committees to CEDAW and the Committee Against 
Torture have also recognized that violence against women constitutes torture and such amounts 
 
Sexual Violence in Africa: Case Studies of Liberia, Northern Uganda, and Eastern Democratic Republic of 
Congo” in Alissa Ackerman and Rich Furman (eds) Sex Crimes: Transnational Problems and Global 
Perspectives (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), Chapter 9; UN Women, “Investigating Conflict-
Related Gender-Based Crimes – Lessons from Iraq and Syria,” Relief Web, October 26, 2017, 
https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/investigating-conflict-related-sexual-and-gender-based-crimes-
lessons. 
4 Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija (Trial Judgment) IT-95-17/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) (10 December 1998); Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 
September 1998); UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ISBN No.92-9227-
227-6, (July 17, 1998) Preamble https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-
0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf. 
5 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 217 A (III) (December 10, 1948) 
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/; UN General Assembly, International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, Treaty Series Vol.999, 171 (December 16, 1966). 
6 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Treaty Series, 
Vol.993, 3 (December 16, 1966). 
7 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
Treaty Series, Vol.1249, 13 (December 18, 1979); UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, CEDAW General Recommendation No.19: Violence Against Women, 1992, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm. 
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to a breach of Articles 5 of the UDHR and 7 of the ICCPR; it is additionally covered by the 
Convention Against Torture.8  
While human rights primarily govern the relationship between states and individuals, 
there is also a duty on states to prevent breaches of these human rights by non-state actors.9 
Prosecution of human rights breaches at the ICC through the complementarity principle, when 
they are committed on a mass scale and thus amount to breaches of international criminal law, 
is a crucial way to ensure accountability is achieved for individual perpetrators of human rights 
abuses, be they state or non-state actors.10   
 
Significance and Objective 
This paper seeks to compare the recent prosecutorial strategies of the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) in the ICC with regards to SGBV crimes, specifically by comparing the 
OTP’s varied legal approaches in the Bemba and Lubanga cases.11 While there is much 
literature examining the importance of the ad hoc tribunals regarding the prosecution of SGBV, 
this paper seeks to add to the scholarship that scrutinizes more specifically the recent ICC cases 
in this area, the scholarship on which is somewhat more limited due to the dearth of SGBV 
convictions. Despite what often appears to be overwhelming evidence suggesting proliferation 
of SGBV, it is not always included in initial indictments issued by the OTP – be this as a result 
of systematic issues, legislative issues or social perceptions. If not even included in initial 
indictments, the chances of conviction for SGBV is automatically greatly reduced.  
 
8 UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Treaty Series, Vol.1465, 85 (December 10, 1984). 
9 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 217 A (III), Preamble, (December 10, 1948) 
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. 
10 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ISBN No.92-9227-227-6, (July 17, 
1998) Article 17(1)(a) [261] https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-a. 
11 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424 (15 June 2009); Prosecutor v Lubanga, ICC-
01/04-01/06, (14 March 2012). 
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By comparing the circumstances under which SGBV – where it falls under the 
jurisdiction of the court – has and has not been prosecuted wherever it occurs as proscribed by 
the Rome Statute, and the reasoning for these irregularities, we can gain a clearer picture as to 
the root causes for the lack of final convictions for SGBV. This understanding will then help 
us to see if the lack of inclusion of SGBV in indictments can in fact always be viewed as a 
failure for gender justice, or whether gender justice can still be achieved under these 
circumstances.   
As SGBV is primarily a gendered crime perpetrated typically against women and girls, 
this paper will measure the successes of the OTP’s strategies primarily from a gender justice 
viewpoint, however it does acknowledge the forced use of SGBV by young boys in the 
Lubanga case and the importance of SGBV justice for all parties, male and female.  
This research comes at a critical time where the ICC faces a variety of ongoing criticisms 
– both procedural and substantive in the case of SGBV prosecution - and increasing numbers 
of member states are threatening withdrawal from the Rome Statute.12 It cannot be asserted 
that increased prosecution for SGBV would encourage increased trust, compliance and co-
operation of member states with the court. The opposite may in fact be true – where, as a result 
of increasing criminal acts coming under the court’s scrutiny in the realm of SGBV, states 
become less willing to co-operate with the ICC due to fear of their own prosecution. (Indeed 
as a court which relies extensively on state co-operation, worsening relations between the ICC 
and member states might ensure that the collection of evidence, testimony, official documents 
and policies become even less accessible to all parties involved in trials, thereby challenging 
 
12 Stephanie Hancock and Param-Preet Singh, “Interview: Finally, Justice for Victims in Afghanistan?” Human 
Rights Watch, November 20, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/ 
news/2017/11/20/interview-finally-justice-victims-afghanistan. 
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the credibility of the ICC further.13 Or indeed it may result in more charges being dropped on 
the procedural basis of lack of evidence before any substantive charges are even scrutinized.14  
It is crucial to embrace this potential reality however, so this paper therefore has to recognize 
that, in fact, increased prosecution of SGBV in the short-term might have an adverse impact 
on prosecution of SGBV in the long-term.) Nevertheless, the ICC is mandated to ensure the 
effective prosecution of SGBV to increase the protection of the rights of individuals – a 
function agreed upon by its current 123 States Parties - and this aim should not be compromised 
or limited as a result of coercion by states that do not comply with human rights obligations.15 
In order to approach this analysis, this paper will address in turn the historical 
conceptualization of SGBV, including changing perceptions of sexual and gender-based 
violence since World War II, and the utilization of rape as a tool of war in 20th Century conflict. 
It will look at the development of international humanitarian law with regards SGBV, 
particularly within the statutes for and jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).16 
Given these legal innovations, this paper will finally examine the more recent Rome Statute 
and how it has shaped the jurisprudence of the ICC, with specific focus on the Bemba case 
(where SGBV was included in initial indictments) contrasted to the Lubanga case (where no 
such inclusion in initial indictments existed, despite overwhelming evidence suggesting the 
occurrence of sexual violence against child soldiers.)17 Analysis will firstly determine the 
factors that shaped the Office of the Prosecutor’s approach to pursue SGBV charges in Bemba, 
 
13 James Meernik, “Justice, Power and Peace: Conflicting Interests and the Apprehension of ICC Suspects,” 
International Criminal Law Review 13, (2013) 169-190; 169. 
14 Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11, https://www.icc-cpi.int/kenya/kenyatta.  
15 ICC, “Joining the International Criminal Court: Why Does it Matter?” ICC, 2018, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/ 
Universality_Eng.pdf.  
16 UN Security Council, “Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” S/RES/827, 
(May 25, 1993); UN Security Council, “Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,” Resolution 
955, (November 8, 1994). 
17 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424 (15 June 2009); Prosecutor v Lubanga, ICC-
01/04-01/06, (14 March 2012). 
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and then compare where these criteria were not met in Lubanga. It will finally consider whether 
lack of inclusion of SGBV in the Lubanga initial indictment automatically meant gender justice 
was not achieved at all, or whether it could still be considered a success.  
The author hypothesizes that despite the important incorporation of legal recourse for 
SGBV within the Rome Statute, justice for SGBV can still be improved by the OTP adopting 
a prosecutorial strategy which includes SGBV within all initial indictments of the OTP where 
there is some, even if not substantial amounts, of evidence suggesting its occurrence.   
 
Literature Review 
There are four main areas of literature that this paper will examine, in order to answer 
this research question.  
Pre-Ad Hoc Tribunals: As mentioned above, legislation criminalizing SGBV has of 
course developed at a similar pace to the social perceptions of sexual and gender-based 
violence. This paper will examine the provision of SGBV in the major international legal texts, 
briefly noting the lack of provision for sexual violence in any of the Hague Conventions and 
Regulations of 1907 and the Nuremberg Charter, and then look more specifically towards its 
increasing coverage in the Statutes for the ICTY and ICTR, and finally the Rome Statute.18 
The author will refer to the vast array of literature which heavily critiques the placement 
of SGBVs ‘under categories dealing with honor and dignity’, for example explored by Bedont 
and Hall-Martinez.19 This is because such contextual placement has been highlighted by 
scholars to emphasize that women who have experienced SGBV have been shamed, or are the 
‘property of others, needing protection perhaps’; not that they are actually the subject of rights 
 
18 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ISBN No.92-9227-227-6, (July 17, 
1998) Article 17(1)(a) [261] https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-a. 
19 Barbara Bedont and Katherine Hall-Martinez, “Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes under the International 
Criminal Court,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 6, No.1 (1999) 65-85; 70.  
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irrespective of their ties to or judgment by men.20 Aolain, Haynes and Cahn also display 
concern within their writing that such an approach detracts from the vast levels of emotional 
and physical harm suffered by victims of SGBV, and does not fully convey the gravity of 
suffering that inevitably flows from these crimes.21 This paper will touch on the problems 
highlighted by scholars concerning the lasting effects of these archaic perceptions in current 
legislation.  
ICTY and ICTR Legislation and Case Law: A common thread throughout the literature 
relating to SGBV in international law is to place great emphasis on the investigations and 
tribunals following the situations in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. These tribunals are 
considered as turning points for the increased recognition of the severity of SGBV. Many 
authors applaud the ad-hoc tribunals, praising them as enlightening platforms that in fact 
uncovered both the prevalence of SGBV and the need to prosecute it at the international level. 
However not all of the analysis of the ICTY and ICTR legislation and jurisprudence is positive; 
Chapter 2 seeks to explore both sides of this debate and establish just to what extent the ad hoc 
tribunals paved the way for adequate SGBV prosecution. 
Rome Statute: The third area of literature that will be examined will address the debate 
surrounding to what extent the legal and procedural framework provided by the Rome Statute 
allows for the Office of the Prosecutor to pursue charges of SGBV. It will draw from the 
previous sections mentioned to evaluate whether or not there has been an improvement in the 
protection of SGBV at the international criminal level. The paper will discuss the background 
to the Rome Statute, the language and definitions contained in the Statute, and finally the 
procedural difficulties that have arisen through the Rome Statute’s provisions, including those 
that remain somewhat unclear to practitioners.  
 
20 Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes, 221. 
21 Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Francesca Haynes and Naomi Cahn, “Criminal Justice for Gendered Violence and 
Beyond,” International Criminal Law Review 11 (2011) 425-443; 426.  
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Bemba and Lubanga Scholarship: The paper will then apply these Rome Statute 
challenges to the work of the OTP in practice. It will link the aforementioned issues regarding 
language, definitions and procedural challenges in the Rome Statute with evidence from the 




This paper used three key methods to assess the development and structure of the current 
international legal mechanisms for prosecution of SGBV. Firstly, the author accessed primary 
source documents from civil society organizations, government agencies and extensive 
literature in the field to inform this paper. Secondly, the author reviewed legal cases and texts 
from the ICTY, ICTR and ICC and drew inconsistencies, developments, disappointments, and 
comparisons between the case law. Finally, this author conducted semi-structured qualitative 
in-person and phone interviews with key individuals within the spheres of international 
criminal law, gender justice, and the intersection between the two, including with members of 
the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, pro bono defense lawyers from the Bemba case, key 
academics in gender justice and members of non-governmental organizations. These 
interviews were conducted in person in New York and in The Hague.  
As a research study which examined the context behind policy and legal decisions, this 
study greatly benefitted from qualitative research from interviews, which allowed the sharing 
of personal human experiences and interactions to explain complex legal issues. Specifically, 
interviews were designed to shed a light on the primary motivations for ICC prosecutorial 
strategy, and internal procedural constraints faced by ICC prosecutors, including problems with 
the practical applicability of the Rome Statute when prosecuting SGBV. It also sought to 
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uncover disharmony between the branches of the ICC as a larger body. Qualitative research 
was the only form of data collection used. 
Gaining perspectives from interviews conducted both inside and out-with the ICC 
ensured that data was not biased entirely in favor of current OTP lawyers and their practices, 
and was scrutinized from third parties who were not directly involved in legal application of 
the Rome Statute. This was an attempt to ensure that data collected was well-rounded and 
ultimately as accurate as possible. 
 
Study Design Limitations 
Despite the calculated choices made in the research design process of this study, a 
number of limitations should be acknowledged.  
A primary limitation of this study relates to the absence of testimony from both the 
victims of sexual and gender-based violence in the Bemba and Lubanga cases, or other victims 
of SGBV as an atrocity crime committed under ICC jurisdiction. Such narratives could have 
provided crucial insight into the priorities of local women with regards their hopes for legal 
intervention in SGBV crimes; for example how best to achieve gender justice, in which forms 
victim reparations are most desirable and so forth. The result of this lack of information has 
meant that the conclusions drawn regarding the successes of these cases for justice come from 
a primarily legal, and wider, viewpoint without affirmation at the local level. They remain 
somewhat hypothetical in some respects. The decision to not include victims’ testimony was 
largely rooted in both the difficulties of locating many of these women, and also due to the 
risks of inducing mental distress throughout or post-interview for the victims of these brutal 
crimes. As someone lacking specific training in dealing with such issues or medical clinical 
experience, this would have been too hazardous for potential participants. However, by 
interviewing legal practitioners and NGO workers who have had direct exposure to such 
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victims, I was able to garner an idea of some of experiences and opinions of SGBV victims 
through these middle parties.   
A second limitation relates to the fact that the data collected through these interviews 
was restricted to the specificities of the ICC context, and as the one of the few global courts 
pursuing international justice, it could be problematic to transfer these findings to any other 
settings or generalize this study’s impact. Indeed the focus on only two cases which occurred 
in the African context further narrowed the scope of this study to crimes committed in one 
geographical region. 
A final limitation of this research relates to the fact that the outcome of the Bemba case 
changed mid-way through research. Bemba was in fact acquitted from his SGBV charges in 
July of this year (2018), which somewhat disrupted the initial research conducted regarding 
gender justice in that case. Nonetheless, this is always a possibility when researching such 
current cases, and in fact added a discussion point in the interesting comparison of the case 













Chapter Two: 20th and 21st Century Legal and Human Rights Innovations  
 
This chapter seeks to provide a comprehensive background as to the legal innovations in 
the late-21st Century and early-20th Century regarding international criminal law and the 
inclusion of provisions against SGBV.  
 
Rape as a Tool of War – Perception of SGBV Throughout History  
Mass rape has occurred in conflict throughout history; in fact rape was utilized by 
combatants as a technique of warfare. Moshan refers to how ‘rape has always been a 
fundamental and accepted military tactic’ in her article ‘Women, War and Words’.22 She also 
describes how in various conflicts sexual violence is used as a ‘weapon of terror’ to demoralize 
and break down communities.23 Along a similar vein, Jurasz emphasizes the political 
significance of women during times of war, for holding communities together, and thus how 
the destruction of these women signifies in some ways the final destruction of the 
civilizations.24 Indeed Oosterveld recalls that during the time of the Peacekeeping Operations 
in Rwanda, Roméo Dallaire would comment that the ‘genocide was very gendered’ because 
the bodies of the women at roadblocks always demonstrated evidence of having been raped or 
sexually mutilated before being killed.25 Rape was specifically ordered by command in this 
situation. 26 By certain scholars, SGBV has been classified as a form of biological warfare.27  
 
22 Sari Moshan, “Women, War and Words” 157. 
23 Sari Moshan, “Women, War and Words” 159. 
24 Olga Jurasz, “About justice that is yet to come: a few remarks about the international pursuit of post-conflict 
gender justice,” Journal of Gender Studies 24(1) (2015) 58. 
25 Valerie Oosterveld referencing Roméo Dallaire who led the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Rwanda, , see 
https://www.romeodallaire.com; Phone Interview with Valerie Oosterveld, August 7, 2018, from New York 
City. 
26 Human Rights Watch, “Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath,” 
Human Rights Watch, September 1996, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm 
27 Beverly Allen, Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996) 123. 
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On the contrary, authors such as Baaz and Stern approach rape in wartime conversely; 
they assert that to reduce rape to a military strategy ‘accords too much rationality and 
intentionality to wartime violence’.28 Oosterveld disputes this assertion however, noting that 
while SGBV might occasionally be random and isolated, SGBV in conflict can most often be 
foreseen; any assertion to the contrary is a myth. SGBV is well-documented to be a way that 
troops seek revenge or punish civilians; Oosterveld notes that judges of international criminal 
law must begin to acknowledge this in order so that we can progress the effectiveness our 
justice systems.29  
Not only do academics assert that SGBV can be used as a tactic of war, but traditionally 
SGBV was in fact seen as a spoil of war by combatants. Copelon discusses this in ‘Gender 
Crimes as War Crimes,’ condemning the fact that rape is deemed as a ‘necessary reward for 
fighting men’. 30 In particular increasing evidence continues to emerge regarding the use of 
comfort women in Japan for example, specifically providing sexual services to military forces 
throughout WW2; thus not only was sexual slavery utilized in history, but it was also 
systematically encouraged by governmental agencies.31 Copelon also gives an in-depth 
historical perspective regarding such practices in Asia during WWII, where women were 
reduced to being the ‘booty’ of war and yet there was little to no legal accountability for such 
acts in the post WWII military tribunals.32 Literature critically examines the idea women were 
an ‘entitlement’ of the victors; there is a large body of work critiquing this conceptualization 
of women as it reduces women’s value to objects whose sole purpose is the gratification of 
 
28 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War: Perceptions, Prescriptions, 
Problems in the Congo and Beyond, (New York: Zed Books Limited, 2013) 85. 
29 Phone Interview with Valerie Oosterveld, August 7, 2018, from New York City. 
30 Copelon, “Gender Crimes,” 220. 
31 Toshiyuki Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution During World War II and the 
US Occupation, (New York: Routledge, 2002) 9. 
32 Copelon, “Gender Crimes,” 221. 
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men.33 The clear historical entrenchment of SGBV in conflict practices provides some insight 
as to why exactly the legal provision of SGBV is still somewhat lacking in modern times.  
 
War Crimes Law 
Pre-Ad Hoc Tribunals 
Legislation criminalizing SGBV has of course developed at a similar pace to the social 
perceptions of sexual and gender-based violence, outlined above. One of the only early 
provisions legislating against SGBV was contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions (notably, 
the Hague Conventions and Regulations of 1907 and the Nuremberg Charter lacked any 
provisions for sexual violence.)34 
Article 27 of the 4th Convention detailed women ‘shall be especially protected against 
any attack on their honor, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of 
indecent assault’.35 Indeed the 1977 Additional Protocols similarly placed SGBV solely within 
the context and rhetoric of honor and dignity.36 Bedont and Hall-Martinez are among many 
scholars that heavily critique the placement of SGBV ‘under categories dealing with honor and 
dignity’.37 Such contextual placement appears to emphasize that women who have experienced 
SGBV have been shamed, or are the ‘property of others, needing protection perhaps’; not that 
they are actually the subject of rights irrespective of their ties to or judgment by men.38 Aolain, 
 
33 Ethol Tolbach and Rachel Reed, “Understanding Rape” in Cheryl Brown Travis, Evolution, Gender and 
Rape, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003) 130.  
34 International Conferences (The Hague), “Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land,” 18 October 1907; 
United Nations, “Charter of the International Military Tribunal – Annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution 
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement)” (August 8, 1945). 
35 Article 27 “Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,” (Geneva, August 
12, 1949). 
36 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),” 1125 UNTS 3 
(June 8, 1977) and “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),” 1125 UNTS 609 (June 8, 1977). 
37 Bedont and Hall-Martinez, “Ending Impunity,” 70. 
38 Copelon, “Gender Crimes,” 221. 
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Haynes and Cahn also display concern within their writing that such an approach detracts from 
the vast levels of emotional and physical harm suffered by victims of SGBV, and does not fully 
convey the gravity of suffering that inevitably flows from these crimes.39  
It is contested these linguistically ill-suited legal provisions can be linked to a genuine 
lack of understanding and empirical research with regards to the psychological, social and 
physical damage relating to the immediate and lasting effects of SGBV at the time. Texts from 
the immediate post-war period quite often suggested women encouraged rape, denied they 
wanted sex when really they did, and that most women had regular fantasies of rape.40 There 
is a dearth of expertise and accurate information of the precise extent of harm that came with 
SGBV throughout the mid 20th-century, which can be somewhat explained by the similar lack 
of attention towards and support for the plight of women and feminist causes of the time 
(second-wave feminism which spearheaded campaigns to end violence against women only 
gained momentum throughout the latter 1960s and 70s.41) 
ICTY and ICTR Legislation and Case Law 
The investigations and tribunals following the situations in the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda are often seen as turning points for the increased recognition of the severity of SGBV. 
Many authors applaud the ad-hoc tribunals, praising them as enlightening platforms that in fact 
uncovered both the prevalence of SGBV and the need to prosecute it at the international level. 
However not all of the analysis of the ICTY and ICTR legislation and jurisprudence is positive. 
For example, there is a large amount of literature relating to one of the pivotal cases in 
the ICTR, Akayesu, which involved the first-ever conviction of rape as a crime against 
humanity.42 Akayesu also recognized rape as genocide and as a form of torture, while the case 
 
39 Aolain, Haynes and Cahn, “Criminal Justice,” 426. 
40 Vivian C Fox, “Historical Perspectives on Violence Against Women,” Journal of International Women’s 
Studies, 4(1) (2002) 19. 
41 Nicole Moulding, Gendered Violence, Abuse and Mental Health in Everyday Lives, (New York: Routledge, 
2015) 10. 
42 Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 September 1998). 
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also broadened the definition of SGBV out-with traditional domestic jurisdictions definitions’ 
for example by recognizing that ‘insertion of objects and/or the use of bodily orifices not 
considered to be intrinsically sexual’43 could constitute rape, while sexual violence ‘may 
include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact’.44 Askin, Copelon and 
Bedont all praise these developments as they widened the scope of crimes which could be 
considered SGBV and thus better represented the actual realities of SGBV for victims.45  
However, this alleged definitional development in Akayesu did not translate into all later 
work of the ad hoc tribunals (attributable in part to the lack of stare decesis in international 
law). In the ICTY case of Furundzija the Trial Chamber adopted a much more mechanical 
approach to the definition of SGBV, which Olga Jurasz perceives to be somewhat restrictive.46 
In her article, ‘About justice that is yet to come’, Jurasz highlights the limitations of the 
Furundzija definition of rape, which asserted that acts have to fulfil an exhaustive list of criteria 
of what amounts to rape (as opposed to a more rounded approach in Akayesu) and thus could 
restrict the ability for rape to be prosecuted.47 Jurasz does, however, commend the sentiment 
of this shift due to the fact that it detaches rape from subjective adjudication relating to the 
realm of an attack on human dignity (mentioned above) and brings it more in line with the 
clearer and procedurally sound requirements of other deliberate acts of aggression. This 
approach she acknowledges can in turn elevate the perceived seriousness of SGBV.  
There were still drawbacks within the statutes that legislated the tribunals, however. For 
example, issues included the fact that rape was only considered a crime against humanity but 
not a war crime; that there was a lack of provision for forms of SGBV other than rape; and that 
 
43 Kelly Dawn Askin, “Gender Crimes Jurisprudence in the ICTR: Positive Developments,” Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 3 (2005) 1010. 
44 Prosecutor v Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 September 1998) at *[688]. 
45 Kelly Dawn Askin, “A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes in International Courts and Tribunals: 
1993 to 2003,” Human Rights Brief 11, No.3 (2004) 17. 
46 Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija, (Trial Judgment) IT-95-17/1-T, ICTY (10 December 1998). 
47 Jurasz, “About Justice,” 62. 
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there were extensive ‘structural barriers that… work[ed] against appropriate evidence 
gathering, witness identification and victim enablement’.48 Indeed with regards actual 
enforcement of the law, the inclusion of SGBV in criminal indictments was somewhat sparse, 
and often the mention of SGBV only appeared in the dicta of cases. In the ICTR specifically, 
indictments including SGBV primarily only arose post-1997 after ‘concerted pressure from 
civil society’.49 Even in the previously mentioned case of Akayesu, which turned out to be a 
critical development in the realm of prosecution of SGBV, there was no indictment for SGBV 
when charges were first brought. It was only the scrutiny of witness testimonies by Judge Pillay 
throughout the trials which acted as key catalyst for prosecution of SGBV in this case.50 Cherie 
Booth highlights the pivotal role that ‘women judges’ have made in such SGBV cases; she 
hints that without such input these cases would not be effectively prosecuted.51 
Other ICTY cases with relevant literary commentary that are worth noting - their benefits 
including holding leaders responsible for crimes committed under their authority and furthering 
the protection and anonymity of witnesses - include The Celebici Case52 and Tadic.53 
 
The Drafting and Effects of the Rome Statute 
The increasing social and political recognition of the importance to hold those 
accountable for mass atrocities – notably exemplified through the growing support for the 
doctrines of universal jurisdiction (see Pinochet No.3), the emerging norm status of the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine and its conceptualization of sovereignty as responsibility, 
 
48 Bedont and Hall-Martinez, “Ending Impunity,” 70; Aolain, Haynes and Cahn, “Criminal Justice,” 438. 
49 Susana SaCouto, “Importance of Effective Investigation of Sexual Violence and Gender-Based Crimes at the 
International Criminal Court,” Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the Law, 17 No.2 (2009) 341. 
50 Cherie Booth, “Prospects and Issues for the International Criminal Court,” in Philippe Sands, From 
Nuremberg to the Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice, (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
169. 
51 Booth, “Prospects and Issues,” 167. 
52 Prosecutor v Zdravko Mucic aka ‘Pavo’, HAzim Delic, Esad Landzo aka ‘Zenga’, Zejnil Delalic (Trial 
Judgement) IT-96-21-T, ICTY (November 16, 1998). 
53 Tadic (Appeal Judgement) IT-94-1-A, ICTY, (July 1999). 
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and the extensive pressure of non-governmental organizations and particularly pro-human 
rights governments - combined with the experience and insight gathered from the ICTR and 
ICTY statutes and case law, led to the desire to create a permanent ICC which could adjudicate 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide to hold perpetrators of these atrocities to 
account.54 Brady, Samson and Oosterveld all recognize the improvement of provisions 
protecting against SGBV in the Rome Statute.55 
Language and Definitions 
Throughout the drafting process, the specific wording of provisions was heavily 
contested between progressive States Parties and their opposition; dissent primarily came from 
anti-choice or particularly religious groups. Bedont and Copelon display particularly strong 
and disgruntled language when describing the opposition to progressive language in the 
statutes; for example Copelon describes the group of Vatican and Arab League countries which 
opposed the use of the word ‘gender’ as opposed to sex as the ‘Unholy Alliance’.56 Yet these 
countries objected to the inclusion of the term ‘gender’ within the statute as it allowed 
opportunity for fluid interpretation of gender on the grounds of evolving socially constructed 
roles, as opposed to distinct biological differences between men and women; biology is often 
the preferred distinction particularly for Islamic countries when defining social and legal 
practices. Even the inclusion of a definition of the term ‘gender’ in the Statute, which was 
eventually provided by the Secretary-General, is labelled as being ‘unworkable and 
impractical’ by Moshan.57 Yet Oosterveld acknowledges that the shift in language from sex to 
 
54 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendary Magistrate and Others, ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3) [2000] 1 
A.C. at *147; Petra Perisic, “Responsibility to Protect – an Emerging Norm of International Law?” Academic 
Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 2 No.9, (October 2013)  443-450; 449; Bedont and Hall-Martinez, “Ending 
Impunity,” 65. 
55 Interview with Helen Brady and Nicole Samson, August 21, 2018, The Hague, The Netherlands; Phone 
Interview with Valerie Oosterveld, August 7, 2018, from New York City. 
56 Copelon, “Gender Crimes,” 236. 
57 Sari Moshan, “Women, War and Words,” 179. 
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gender was seen as a small victory to many.58 At the same time, Bedont and Hall-Martinez 
describe the positive effects of the enumeration of gender-based crimes in a separate paragraph 
of crimes against humanity. This actually worked to highlight the severity and uniqueness of 
such crimes. The debate in this area is extensive; there appears to be a real lack of agreement 
within the literature as to whether the Rome Statute was actually a victory in terms of language 
for the protection of SGBV. 
A further drafting issue ties to which acts would actually be considered SGBV; this 
continues to be a relevant and ongoing debate. While the Rome Statute appears to contain a 
wide definition of sexual crimes, asserting that ‘rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity’ are all covered, this definition is still critiqued as being too narrow by certain scholars 
such as Moshan. This is because while the clause initially appears to attempt to catch any other 
crimes that are not enumerated but are of ‘comparable gravity’, it may in fact unnecessarily 
restrict what constitutes a sexual crime and ‘regrettably’ imply ‘that violence against women 
is not always a grave offense’.59 Further, while the inclusion of ‘forced pregnancy’ was actually 
considered by many to be a positive step forward in the protection of SGBV, it was considered 
to be watered down from the proposed terminology of ‘enforced pregnancy’ due to the fear of 
primarily Islamic and anti-choice societies that the statute would contain ‘misleading linkages 
to the issue of legislation of abortion’.60  
Yet conversely, the codification of the crime of ‘sexual slavery’ not only stimulated 
discussion among the international community during the drafting process regarding the 
specific harms often faced by women during war, but its inclusion displayed a deep and 
growing understanding by member states of the intricacies of distinct forms of SGBV (sexual 
 
58 Valerie Oosterveld, “The Definition of ‘Gender’ in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Step Forward or Back for International Criminal Justice,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 18 (2003) 56. 
59 Sari Moshan, “Women, War and Words,” 182. 
60 Bedont and Hall-Martinez, “Ending Impunity,” 68. 
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slavery was previously just referred to restrictively as ‘enforced prostitution’).61 Nonetheless, 
the varied literature unequivocally suggests a constant conflict throughout the drafting process 
relating to the balancing of different cultural and social definitions and norms regarding the 
value of women within different societies. This resulted in a somewhat compromised document 
that did not push SGBV related language and definitions to their full and progressive potential.   
Procedural Debates 
Fiona O’Regan makes an in-depth analysis of the procedural difficulties faced in 
applying the Rome Statute in the context of the recent Bemba case.62 Her article highlights the 
lack of agreement between the branches of the ICC – particularly the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) 
and the Office of the Prosecutor – with regards their distinct roles and powers. While this is 
not wholly surprising, due to the nature of the ICC as the first permanent court of its kind and 
its consequent inexperience, this procedural downfall must nonetheless be highlighted and 
conclusions drawn on whether this impacts the effectiveness of the court. Certainly, O’Regan’s 
early assertion that the lack of coherence and agreement over procedural provisions (in 
particular the functions of cumulative charging and Regulation 55) within the Rome Statute 
led to incorrect charges being brought in the indictment of Bemba was proved correct this year; 
precisely this played a role in his subsequent acquittal, which is discussed further below.   
Mannix also discusses the various criticisms levelled at the OTP in ‘A Quest for 
Justice.’63 She adopts a somewhat sympathetic tone towards the work of the ICC, due to the 
evidentiary and physical difficulties that are inevitably faced simply by being an international 
court. Mannix highlights for example the lack of ‘police force’ and extensive reliance on state 
 
61 Valerie Oosterveld, “Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court: Advancing International Law,” 
Michigan Journal of International Law 25(3) (2004) 608-615. 
62 Fiona O’Regan, “Prosecutor vs Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo: The Cumulative Charging Principles, Gender-
Based Violence, and Expressivism,” Georgetown Journal of International Law 43 No.4 (2012) 1323-1360; 
Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424 (June 15, 2009). 
63 Bridget Mannix, “A Quest for Justice: Investigating Sexual and Gender-Based Violence at the International 
Criminal Court,” James Cook University Law Review, 21 (2014) 11. 
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co-operation for effective prosecution of cases.64 Language, cultural barriers and security risks 
are all addressed in her article too.65 Mannix also explores the crucial input of NGOs and 
Women’s Initiatives in ensuring gender justice, but references the Katanga and Lubanga 
decisions as examples of where procedural downfalls of the ICC have negatively impacted case 
outcomes regarding SGBV.66 
It is clear that most of the research and literature critiquing the ad hoc criminal tribunals 
and the ICC assess the effectiveness of prosecution for SGBV to varying degrees; there is a 
lack of consistency in overall assessment of the court’s effectiveness. While most of the 
literature undoubtedly recognizes a level of improvement in the understanding and legislative 
coverage of SGBV from the early war crimes statutes immediately post-WW2, the current 
Rome Statute and work of the ICC is by no means perfect.  
It will therefore be advantageous to examine the Bemba and Lubanga cases more closely 
to consider all of these critiques in practice and attempt to determine which factors actually 
impact the prosecutorial strategies adopted by the OTP.  Once this identification is made, we 
are then able to consider which prosecutorial strategies are most effective in terms of gaining 









64 Mannix, “A Quest for Justice,” 11. 
65 Mannix, “A Quest for Justice,” 11-13. 
66 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, ICC, (September 25, 
2009); Prosecutor v Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06, ICC, (March 14, 2012). 
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Chapter 3: Conditions for Inclusion of SGBV in Indictments 
 
Background to the Bemba Case 
On 23 May 2008, the Pre-Trial Chamber III issued an arrest warrant for Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, a Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) national, following an application by 
the OTP.67 The original charges pursued by the OTP against Bemba were for five counts of 
war crimes under Article 7 Rome Statute; specifically torture, rape, outrages against personal 
dignity, murder and pillaging.68 Bemba was also charged with three counts of crimes against 
humanity; specifically torture, rape and murder.69 The charges came following Bemba’s 
alleged participation in the conflict on the Central African Republic territory between 25 
October 2002 and 15 March 2003. Bemba was the ‘President and Commander-in-Chief’ of the 
Movement de Libération du Congo (MLC) through which he assumed de jure and de facto 
authority regarding military decisions.70  
In October 2010 the charges against Bemba were reduced to three counts of war crimes 
and two counts of crimes against humanity, based on the PTC’s rejection of the OTP’s attempt 
at cumulative charging.71 Nonetheless the rape charges against Bemba remained, making 
Bemba only the third person to ever face initial charges of sexual violence at the ICC. Bemba 
 
67 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Warrant of Arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08 
(May 23, 2008) https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_03303.PDF. 
68 Specifically under Article 8(2)(c)(i) ‘violence to life and person, in particular of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture’; Article 8(2)(c)(ii) ‘committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment’; Article 8(2)(e)(v) ‘pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault’; and finally 
Article 8(2)(e)(vi) ‘committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in 
Article 7, paragraph 2(f), enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious 
violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions.’ 
69 Specifically under Article 7(1)(f) ‘torture’ and Article 7(1)(g) ‘rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity’ as part of a 
‘widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.’ 
70 ICC Press Release, “The Confirmation of Charges Hearing in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo is Starting Monday 12 January 2009,” ICC Press Release, January 9, 2009, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=the+c 
onfirmation+of+charges+hearing+in+the+case+of+the+prosecutor+v_+jean_pierre. 
71 Bemba Charging Decision, ICC/01/05-01/08-424, [204-05], [310-312]. 
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was notably also the first to be charged as a military commander liable for the sexual violence 
committed by his subordinates.  
The message from ICC prosecutors was clear; ‘crimes of sexual violence are important 
enough to prosecute’ and military leaders are always required to ‘punish subordinates for 
gender-based crimes.’72 The charges were hailed to signify a ‘milestone in the history of 
international criminal justice’ by ex-UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in 
Conflict.73  
 
Analysis of Factors Encouraging SGBV Charges 
This section seeks to identify some of the key factors that contributed to the pursuit of 
sexual violence charges by the OPT in the Bemba case.  
Complementarity Principle: Firstly, with regards case admissibility, Trial Chamber III 
confirmed that the ICC could exercise jurisdiction over Bemba’s criminality within their 
Decision on the Admissibility and Abuse of Process Challenge. This decision identified that 
the CAR has ‘domestic inability to conduct this trial’ and thus was ‘unable’ to prosecute 
Bemba, as required by Article 17(1)(a) Rome Statute.74 Jurisdiction therefore fell upon the ICC 
to prosecute the case.  
Bensouda’s Influence on Pursuing SGBV Charges: 
The lead prosecutor in the Bemba case, Fatou Bensouda, notably articulated SGBV as a 
top priority in her prosecutorial strategy at the ICC.75 Before reaching the ICC, Bensouda 
 
72 Brigid Inder of the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice quoted in David Smith, “Former Congo Vice-
President Bemba Used ‘Rape as his Method’ of War,” The Guardian, November 22, 2010, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/22/congo-vice-president-trial-war-crimes. 
73 Margot Wallstrom in Aaron Gray-Block, “Congo ex-VP Bemba on Trial in Hague for War Crimes,” Reuters, 
November 22, 2010, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-warcrimes-bemba/congo-ex-vp-bemba-on-trial-in-
hague-for-war-crimes-idUSTRE6AL2UL20101122.  
74 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ISBN No.92-9227-227-6, (July 17, 
1998) Article 17(1)(a) [261] https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-a. 
75 ICC, “Case Information Sheet: Situation in the Central African Republic, The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08,” Updated September 2018, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/BembaEng.pdf. 
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pioneered women’s rights in The Gambia and raised awareness of sexual violence directed at 
women during conflict.76 She commended the gender-sensitive lens that emerged in the Rome 
Statute with regards atrocity crimes, noting that it enabled the ICC to afford SGBV ‘the serious 
attention’ that it deserved. The adoption of the 2012-2015 Strategic Plan with its specific focus 
on SGBV in Strategic Goal 3, along with the Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Policy Paper, 
which were both released during the Bemba trial and under Bensouda’s tenure as Chief 
Prosecutor appear to further enhance SGBV protection under the Rome Statute and also 
indicate that SGBV would be prioritized under her leadership.77 Oosterveld recognizes that the 
production of the Policy Paper by Bensouda, which ‘added the background approach’ to how 
to apply the term ‘gender’ in the international criminal law context, really enabled the entire 
OTP to ‘become much more confident in the use of the term’ in subsequent charging 
documents.78 This provided crucial clarification on the definitional ambiguities of gender in 
the Rome Statute that were discussed previously. While Mannix purports that although many 
of the commitments expressed in the Policy Paper regarding SGBV really should have been 
‘standard procedure’ since the adoption of the Rome Statute, this new impetus indicated that 
the court was beginning to head ‘in the right direction.’79 Bensouda has further reinforced her 
devotion to SGBV prosecution, for example by assuring the American Society of International 
Law that the OTP will continue to take SGBV ‘very seriously’ as the court moves forward.80 
It would therefore be an oversight to fail to acknowledge the impact Bensouda’s influence had 
on the OTP’s formulation of SGBV charges against Bemba; particularly when we compare this 
 
76 Marlise Simons, “Gambian Defends the International Criminal Court’s Initial Focus on Africans,” NY Times, 
February 26, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/26/world/africa/ 
26hague.html. 
77 Office of the Prosecutor, “Strategic Plan 2012-2015,” ICC, October 11, 2013, 27; Office of the Prosecutor, 
“Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes,” ICC, June 2014.   
78 Phone Interview with Valerie Oosterveld, August 7, 2018, from New York City. 
79 Mannix, “A Quest for Justice,” 17. 
80 Fatou Bensouda, “Gender and Sexual Violence Under the Rome Statute,” in Emmanuel Decauz et al, (eds) 
“From Human Rights to International Criminal Law: Studies in Honour of an African Jurist, the Late Judge 
Laïty Kama,” (2007) 416; FORA TV, “Bensouda: ICC Prioritizes Crimes Against Women & Children,” Daily 
Motion, 2011, https://www.dailymotion.com/video/xhzfdm. 
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to the relatively sparse inclusion of SGBV in indictments at the international criminal level 
previously. 
Wide Range of Crimes Brought in Charges: 
The thoroughness of Bensouda’s SGBV pursuit against Bemba was commendable; 
SGBV was pursued as both a crime against humanity and a war crime in Bemba’s charges. By 
making SGBV a central facet to the charges from the earliest stage in proceedings, as opposed 
to a secondary or less fundamental element, the OTP ensured that SGBV charges would be 
more capable of withstanding any scrutiny and potential reformulation conducted by the Pre-
Trial Chamber. Indeed previous case law from the ad hoc tribunal in Rwanda does suggest that 
SGBV charges hold a higher standard of proof in the eyes of judges and are more susceptible 
to reduction by Chamber judges than other charges are.81 Accordingly, the OTP essentially 
covered all potential bases for SGBV charges against Bemba.82  
In a similar vein, this also negated the need for the PTC to utilize Regulation 55 to 
recharacterize the SGBV offences later on in the proceedings, which potentially could have 
impeded the rights of the defense and called into question the entire legitimacy of the trial 
(perceived unfairness such as this regarding altering aspects of Bemba’s liability after the 
Confirmation of Charges Decision essentially led to the final Appeal being successful.)83 
 
 
81 Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, “Partial Conviction of Katanga by ICC - Acquittals for Sexual 
Violence and Use of Child Soldiers, The Prosecutor vs. Germain Katanga,” March 7, 2014, 
http://www.iccwomen.org/images/Katanga-Judgement-Statement-corr.pdf; Mannix, “A Quest for Justice,” 23; 
Valerie Oosterveld mentioned in her interview that at the ad hoc tribunals there was clearly a ‘de facto higher 
standard of proof required in command responsibility or in cases involving high-level superiors being linked to 
sexual and gender-based violence’ (Phone Interview with Valerie Oosterveld, August 7, 2018, from New York 
City.)  
82 At the Confirmation of Charges stage, the PTC applied to Celibi test and rejected the cumulative charging 
strategy of the Prosecutor, declining to confirm the torture and outrages upon personal dignity charges because 
they were subsumed within the rape charges. See Bemba Charging Decision, ICC/01/05-01/08-424, [204-05], 
[312]. 
83 See Bemba Charging Decision, ICC/01/05-01/08-424, [203]; Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Appeal Judgment, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red, (June 8, 2018) https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_02984.PDF.  
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Adequate Time to Investigate and Collect Substantial Evidence Before Arrest: 
Another factor that appears to have aided the inclusion of SGBV charges against Bemba 
relates to the ability to conduct a thorough investigation against Bemba before his arrest, 
relatively free of time constraints. The CAR ratified the Rome Statute in 2001, and referred the 
case onto the ICC in December 2004.84 Following analysis of information relating to these 
allegations, an investigation was officially opened in May 2007 (the fourth investigation of the 
ICC at the time).85 Within five months, at least 600 rape victims were identified throughout 
investigations – notwithstanding the many more that likely had not come forward. ‘Credible 
reports’ of rape and other forms of sexual violence were cited, and evidence mounted.86 The 
ICC opened a field office in October 2007 as a base for investigation teams and lawyers, greatly 
helped by the fact that the situation was referred to the ICC by the cooperating CAR 
Government.87 Notably, the field office in Bangui was the fifth established by the ICC and thus 
this practice was becoming familiar to the OTP. The arrest warrant for Bemba was issued in 
May 2008.88 The ICC then had a further two years to investigate crimes in the CAR before the 
trial began. The OTP had four years to formulate the charges against Bemba and were 
becoming better equipped to conduct SGBV-specific interviews and investigations.89 
Although Bemba was not in custody when arrested, he was in exile in Belgium – a party 
to the Rome Statute and thus the government had committed to cooperation with the ICC with 
 
84 ICC, “Central African Republic: Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC 01/05,” https://www.icc-
cpi.int/car, accessed November 5, 2018. 
85 ICC, “Central African Republic.” 
86 UN News, “International Criminal Court Opens Probe into Central African Republic,” UN News, May 22, 
2007, https://news.un.org/en/story/2007/05/219572-international-criminal-court-opens-probe-central-african-
republic. 
87 UN News, “International Criminal Court.” 
88 The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Warrant of Arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-
01/08 (May 23, 2008) https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_03303.PDF. 
89 Interview with Helen Brady and Nicole Samson, August 21, 2018, The Hague, The Netherlands. 
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regards arresting alleged criminals being pursued by the ICC. This aided Bemba’s swift arrest 
by Belgian authorities only a day after the issue of a warrant for his arrest.90  
It appears that the ICC’s increasing familiarity with the processes of conducting 
investigations and establishing field offices, the referral of the case by the CAR as a 
cooperating state party to the Rome Statute, and the arrest easily and swiftly facilitated by the 
Belgian authorities enabled substantial evidence collection of SGBV crimes before Bemba was 
arrested. Indeed, knowledge that Bemba was situated in Belgium, a cooperating state to the 
Rome Statute, perhaps took temporal pressure off the OTP – the office was able to request a 
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Chapter 4: Where This Criteria is Not Met in Lubanga 
Background to Lubanga Case 
The Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Louis Moreno Ocampo, opened an investigation into 
the DRC in June 2004 at the request of the DRC Government; an arrest warrant was issued for 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo in January 2006.91 Lubanga, the alleged ‘founder and leader of the 
Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC)’ - also known as the Forces Patriotiques pour la 
Libération du Congo (FPLC) - was arrested for his involvement in the war crime of 
‘conscripting [and] enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed 
forces [and] using them to participate actively in hostilities,’ a breach of international criminal 
law as prescribed by Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi).92 These crimes were alleged to have taken place in 
the DRC since July 2002. Crucially, Lubanga was the first ever suspect to be ‘arrested and 
transferred’ to the ICC.93    
The OTP’s choice of charges against Lubanga have been an ‘understandably 
controversial’ source of debate.94 This is due to the fact that SGBV charges were not brought, 
despite an extensive amount of evidence that has come to light surrounding the UPC’s alleged 
commission of ‘atrocious sexual violence’ against both civilians and child recruits in the 
conflict. Smith noted that sexual assault ‘reached a massive scale in both frequency and 
brutality.’95 Specifically, evidence suggests that sexual violence was perpetrated against 
abducted girls within the armed forces, as well as against boy child soldiers who were ‘ordered 
to commit crimes’ of SGBV.96 Even the OTP recognized that a ‘pattern of rape’ and ‘torture’ 
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characterized the situation in the DRC.97 Tan proffers that up to an additional seven charges 
should have been added to Lubanga’s indictment under Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statue; 
namely sexual slavery as a war crime and a crime against humanity, inhuman treatment as a 
war crime, cruel treatment as a war crime, rape as a crime against humanity and a war crime, 
and forced marriage as a crime against humanity (as seen in Prosecutor v Brima.)98  
This chapter seeks to identify why the requirements for inclusion of SGBV in the OTP’s 
charges, as identified in Chapter 3, were not met in this case by examining arguments from 
both the academic sphere and the legal sphere.   
 
Why Did the OTP Not Bring SGBV Charges?  
Issues from an Academic Perspective 
Existing SGBV Bias Perpetrating the First Case of the ICC: 
It is widely contended by academics that the lack of SGBV charges were as a result of 
the continuing perpetration of outdated gender norms within the ICC, which were raised in 
chapter two. (Notably, the Lubanga case came before the increased attention on SGBV that 
was initiated by Bensouda in her tenure as Chief Prosecutor, mentioned above.) Ferstman 
alleges that ‘antecedent prosecutorial policies’ led to this ‘shortcoming.’99 It was perceived to 
be a further example of the ‘gender misrecognition’ that has characterized much of the 
international criminal processes throughout the late 20th and early 21st centuries.100 Oosterveld 
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contends that the reluctance by the OTP to pursue SGBV offences - unless ‘incredibly obvious’ 
- came as a result of the ‘constructive ambiguity’ that surrounded the term ‘gender’ and indeed 
peppered many other articles of the Rome Statute; the OTP was uncertain as to how to interpret 
or define the term and thus shied away from approaching it at all.101 Resultantly, Ferstman 
notes that the entire range of harms perpetrated by Lubanga were not fully represented in the 
charges against him, and this hierarchical treatment of atrocity crimes meant that SGBV 
‘victims [were] sidelined’ and the perception of the harm victims faced, both by their 
communities and the wider international sphere, was diminished. This perceived trivialization 
was so even though the Rome Statute was hoped to elevate the status of SGBV as atrocity 
crimes.102  
 
Considerations from a Legal Perspective 
Motivation:  
In spite of the assertions above, Moreno-Ocampo rejects the assertion that the lack of 
understanding of SGBV and the Rome Statute provisions resulted in its exclusion from the 
charges. In fact Moreno-Ocampo’s decision to exclude SGBV came in spite of his 
acknowledgement of his ‘duty to investigate gender crimes.’103 He hired feminist expert 
Catherine MacKinnon as his Special Advisor on Gender Crimes in the Lubanga case and 
explains that he had a team of lawyers who were committed to pursuing gender justice who 
helped him to formulate the charges against Lubanga.104  
Arguably, Moreno-Ocampo’s ‘limited scope’ prosecutorial strategy played the more 
dominant role in this decision than any deliberate desire to evade prosecution for SGBV.105 His 
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‘Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor’ acknowledged some of the 
key differences between domestic prosecution and international prosecution – such as 
‘questions of security on the ground’, ‘possibilities for protection of witnesses,’ and the 
availability for other ‘necessary means of investigation.’106 He highlighted a desire to avoid the 
exhaustive investigations’ and ‘long proceedings’ the other international tribunals had been 
plagued with.107 The OTP also had to swiftly initiate its first investigation in order to begin 
developing the legitimacy of the court within the international community.108 
As such, principles of ‘efficiency’ and ‘low costs’ were prioritized by the OTP at this 
time. Indeed in Moreno-Ocampo’s 2006 Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, he expressed that 
the crimes pursued would be a ‘sample that is reflective of the gravest incidents’ while 
considering ‘as few witnesses as possible are called to testify.’109 This initially does appear to 
continue to perpetuate the practice of hierarchical treatment of crimes at first glance, as only 
the subjectively ‘gravest’ crimes would be pursued, however upon closer inspection it must be 
noted that the crime of murder - which is one of the most frequently pursued by international 
tribunals - was also not included in the indictment due to lack of evidence.110 This somewhat 
unravels the argument that underlying and archaic prejudice played a role in the lack of 
indictment for SGBV in the Lubanga case.  
This analysis would suggest that the Lubanga prosecutorial strategy differed from Bemba 
because, although there was motivation to pursue SGBV it was not Moreno-Ocampo’s top 
strategic priority. This is a crucial distinction.  
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Lack of Evidence: 
It must also be recognized that in fact evidence collection for SGBV is an undoubtedly 
troublesome process, and the Lubanga case was plagued with many of these complications. 
From the outset, investigations into all Rome Statute crimes face widely recognized barriers of 
evidence collection, such as the ‘remote’ location of the OTP; the temporal delays in accessing 
crime scenes and resulting susceptibility to evidence evaporation or tampering; the difficulties 
of accessing witnesses (often as a result of illness and death caused by the atrocity crimes); 
situations of ongoing war and conflict surrounding crime scenes and witnesses; language and 
cultural barriers; and potentially uncooperative State Parties.111  
OTP prosecution lawyer, Nicole Samson, explained that for evidence collection relating 
to SGBV, investigators face additional hurdles still. They have to balance the fragile elements 
of ensuring collection of the ‘best possible evidence’ that can actually be utilized within the 
criminal prosecution framework, while also trying to ‘avoid retraumatizing witnesses’ or 
prompting ‘secondary traumatization.’112 Investigative questioning for SGBV is thus very 
specific; investigators must ensure that for sexual violence victims, the right kinds of questions 
are being asked - including what took place, how it took place, environmental factors, whether 
there was coercion in any way or whether the elements of rape or the sexual violence has been 
met – while doing so in a way that avoids the re-traumatization of the victim. In the early days 
of the court, it is uncertain whether investigators were consistently asking the correct questions 
about SGBV criminality. However, the focus on SGBV has increased in more recent years to 
include ‘specialized training for investigators’ and by bringing in ‘certain expertise’ from other 
entities that are specialized in sexual violence.113 As the ICC’s first investigation, investigatory 
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practices in Lubanga have been perceived as being somewhat underdeveloped and not as 
sensitive to the intricacies of SGBV as they are today.114  
Indeed, investigatory questioning can only occur once witnesses are identified and agree 
to share their story. It appears that, despite the existence of the Witness Protection Program 
within the registry unit of the ICC, the reality is that the Court is still very limited in what it 
can offer a witness. There is little middle ground as to what the court can offer due to capacity 
constraints, despite taking its protection duties very seriously; consequently, witnesses must 
consider in large part the security concerns of meeting with investigators or lawyers or 
providing the depth of testimony required for criminal conviction. Melinda Reed notes that 
although the ICC takes measures to protect witnesses, they can never be implemented with 
100% certainty.115 The lack of existence of an ICC police force, let alone an ICC police force 
situated within these situations, also reduces the capacity for witness protection even further; 
even if the OTP identifies witnesses to help at the investigation phase, ‘it can be a lot harder to 
get those same witnesses to agree to testify at a trial’ due to security issues.116 While the ad-
hoc tribunals were focused on very specific regions, facts and contexts and could therefore 
adapt security practices accordingly, the ICC is faced with multiple situations and new contexts 
constantly; it is more difficult for the court to tap into existing security mechanisms or apply 
lessons from previous context-specific experiences. Consequently, it may follow that in the 
interest of protecting victims, relying on prosecutorial strategies at the ICC that push extremely 
hard for victim testimony to the extent that it endangers participants actually devalues the 
whole aim of international criminal justice as promoting security for vulnerable persons.  
These security concerns were widely felt throughout the Lubanga investigations. Access 
to witnesses was severely hampered because some investigators had to ‘hide the fact that they 
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were conducting an investigation,’ and occasionally intermediaries were even employed in 
certain instances where witnesses were at risk of being identified.117 Further, some 
investigators were unwilling to follow up on their questioning believing that their witnesses 
were at ‘risk of immediate abduction.’118 Even the Trial Chamber recognized the extent of 
‘security risks that adversely affected the investigations’ in Lubanga, which Mannix 
acknowledges is unusual as the PTC often produces ‘unimpressive assessments of the OTP’s 
practices by Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers’.119  
In addition to investigators’ attempts to collect evidence, the OTP also relied heavily on 
Congolese Government and NGO-collected evidence. While there clearly was evidence 
suggesting sexual violence crimes were committed, investigators were unable to uncover 
sufficient evidence to prove that they were part of a larger UPC policy or were ‘systematic’ (as 
required by Article 7(1)) while ensuring safety for the victims of crimes.120  
Helen Brady reassures that the ‘only reason’ not to include charges for SGBV is ‘if there 
really is not evidence.’121 Similarly, Moreno-Ocampo openly notes that despite the search for 
evidence of SGBV in Lubanga and consultation with gender experts, they ‘just couldn’t find 
it’ before bringing the charges against Lubanga.122 Considering all of this analysis, combined 
with Moreno-Ocampo’s policy at the time of pursuing the least burdensome charges, it appears 
hard to criticize the OTP for being unable to uncover significant volumes of evidence to 
satisfactorily support a prosecution of SGBV against Lubanga.  
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Lack of Time to Issue Charges: 
Not only did Moreno-Ocampo’s prosecutorial strategy encourage a swift investigation 
into Lubanga, but particular case-specific time-restraints also intensified this time-pressure; 
this meant that the OTP had to move ahead with the case despite not yet having extensive 
evidence of SGBV. While Lubanga was one of a few suspects who was being investigated by 
the OTP in 2006, he was notably already in the custody of the judicial authority of Kishasha. 
As Moreno-Ocampo contended, this made him ‘the obvious target’ for the first case of the ICC 
because he would be an easy suspect to apprehend due to already being in custody.123 However, 
Moreno-Ocampo and his investigative team felt that, due to the various circumstances 
surrounding Lubanga’s detention, he could have been released imminently for the charges for 
which he was in custody.124 They had to close in and in doing so include only the crimes for 
which they had enough evidence.125 Evidence was strongest for proving the use of child 
soldiers at the time the OTP decided it had to move, hence the formulation of child soldiers 
charges taking precedence; Moreno-Ocampo noted in response to his critics that ‘scholars don’t 
understand that it is factual; it is based on evidence. We had to arrest Lubanga.’126  
While the Bemba case had its own evidential hurdles that surfaced later on in the case, 
the Bemba team did believe it had enough evidence to carry forward SGBV charges at the time 
they had to issue the arrest warrant. This contrasts to Lubanga where they felt that, if they 
delayed issuance any further, they may lose track of the suspect entirely and he would escape 
prosecution completely. This also goes some way in explaining the differing prosecutorial 
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Refusal to Amend Charges Throughout Trial:  
A further aspect of the prosecutorial strategy that warrants examination relates to the 
refusal of the OTP to amend the charges throughout the trial, as more evidence of SGBV came 
to light. For example, Mannix noted that at least ‘15 of the first 25 prosecution witnesses 
(including two expert witnesses) provided testimony of sexual crimes.’127 Yet, although the 
OTP had ‘committed to continuing the investigation’ into other crimes and legally still could 
have applied to the Pre-Trial Chamber alter the charges up until January 2009, in 2006 Moreno-
Ocampo ‘temporarily suspended’ this further investigation and focused instead solely on the 
child soldier charges in hand.128  
Despite this, many efforts were still made to encourage him to change the charges. Judge 
Odio Benito focused much of her questioning throughout the proceedings on the issue of 
SGBV; Chappel notes that of her ‘133 questions to prosecution witnesses, 107 related to sexual 
violence and the presence of women and girls in the armed forces.’129 Additionally, the 
Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice (WIGJ) submitted a request to the PTC to ‘review the 
Prosecutor’s exercise of discretion in the selection of charges’ and regarding whether SGBV 
charges should be considered, however this request was denied. The WIGJ did however submit 
a letter and report to the OTP which contained interviews with 31 victims of ‘acts of rape and 
sexual slavery committed by the UPC’ which were collected by the WIGJ on two field missions 
to the DRC.130 Further, the legal representatives of the victims also filed an application to 
recharacterize the charges under Regulation 55, but this was considered to be beyond the power 
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of the Trial Chamber (such recharacterization should be pursued with the Pre-Trial Chamber 
instead, under Article 61(7)(c)(ii).)131  
Moreno-Ocampo admitted that, had the judge asked him to change the charge, he would 
have obliged, but this was not the case.132 He therefore did not recharacterize the charges, 
deeming that it was ‘late, in the middle of the trial’ and it was ‘unfair for Lubanga;’ the trial 
had already been delayed due to a ‘security problem, disclosure problems’ and so to further 
amend the charges would not have been ‘respecting the human rights of Lubanga.’133 
Particularly as the first case of the ICC, protecting Lubanga’s right to due process was crucial 
for upholding the legitimacy of the court and also for ensuring that his conviction was not 
overturned at a later date due to prejudice against the rights of the accused. Indeed, in the ICTY 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, requests to recharacterize charges relating to SGBV 
have previously been declined on the basis of ‘unfair prejudice to the accused’, so Ocampo’s 
concern was not unfounded.134 Further, protection of the rights of the accused and procedural 
unfairness played a large role in the acquittal of Bemba earlier this year. This exercise of 
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Chapter 5 – Comparing the Outcomes of Bemba and Lubanga 
 
Lubanga Outcome 
Although SGBV charges were not individually pursued against Lubanga, differentiating 
it from Bemba, this section will now consider how in fact the prosecutorial strategy in Lubanga 
still prioritized a gendered aspect in the articulation of charges. It will consider whether, despite 
this different strategy, gender justice was still achieved.  
SGBV charges were very interestingly incorporated into the charges for the conscription 
and enlistment of child soldiers to a large extent. Early in the Prosecution’s submissions, 
Moreno-Ocampo stated that it was his office’s mission to ‘ensure that Thomas Lubanga [was] 
held criminally responsible for the atrocities committed against those little girl soldiers… used 
as sexual prey’ during the conflict.135 The Prosecution did highlight throughout the proceedings 
that enlisted and conscripted girls were ‘the daily victims of rape by the commanders’ in the 
training camps and that ‘young boys were instructed to rape.’136 They noted how girl soldiers 
were ‘abused’ and used ‘as sexual slaves,’ and ‘this suffering [was] part of the suffering of the 
conscription.’137 Thus the OTP clearly aimed to expose ‘this gender aspect of the crime’ of 
conscription which had been uncovered during investigations.138 The OTP also contended that 
the sexual exploitation of girls and boys fulfilled an ‘essential support function’ to the group, 
as defined by the Paris Principles, and thus also constituted the use of children ‘to participate 
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actively in hostilities.’139 Therefore, although only child soldier charges were brought, SGBV 
was arguably still at the ‘centerpiece’ of the Prosecution’s case.140 Samson expressed that this 
was an attempt to ensure that SGBV was not isolated completely despite lacking the evidence 
to bring it as an individual charge; they tried to ‘put it into the bigger package of what 
happened.’141  
Moreno-Ocampo actually contends that this construction of Lubanga’s criminality was a 
‘very interesting new concept’ that might have ironically exposed the barbaric nature of the 
SGBV in this case more so than separate SGBV charges could have.142 He contended that by 
framing the SGBV evidence firmly within the context of the child soldiers charges, this 
distanced the girls from the perception that they were ‘bush wives’ which could have 
implications of duty, experience and older age.143 These connotations could have 
‘counteract[ed] the perception of the forced nature of the sexual violation of these children’ 
and consequently undermined the illegitimacy of the sexual violence against them.144  
Additionally, the OTP’s construction of charges may have sent a crucial message 
regarding rape of wives within the DRC. In Ituri, traditional perceptions of marriage specify 
that ‘once a girl is sexually ‘taken’ by a man, she is his property.’ Indeed an FAPC colonel 
admitted that ‘taking these girls out of these forced ‘marriages’ would be very difficult.’145 
Moreno-Ocampo recalls that many of the SGBV victims were therefore ignored because ‘they 
were the wife of the commander.’146 Thus, by firmly placing the SGBV aspect within the child 
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soldiers charges, it was further distanced from any ‘bush wives’ justification that stand-alone 
SGBV charges might have been subject to. Moreno-Ocampo wanted to clearly send the 
message that despite what the marriage might mean in the local context, you still ‘cannot rape 
girls who are forced to enlist’ or enter marriage.147  
These contentions may seem challenging in many respects from a feminist perspective, 
as they suggest that ICC Chambers and judges may have considered a culturally relativist 
perspective in judging this case, or not treated the crimes with appropriate gravity regardless 
of their position in society, when ideally SGBV should be considered illegal in all contexts. 
This idea also perpetuates the notion that bush wives are ‘power[less] and dehuman[ized],’ as 
noted by Grover.148 Current social norms do acknowledge that SGBV should be considered 
crimes worthy of stand-alone charges, as discussed in chapters one and two.   
Yet legally, this may have been a necessary concession to make. Earlier analysis 
demonstrated that legal institutions are considerably lagging behind many current socially 
accepted norms relating to SGBV. Hobbs notes that there is a truly systemized lack of 
accounting for SGBV that goes beyond the OTP and across the entire court.149 Indeed, based 
on the case law of the ICC which is greatly lacking in convictions for stand-alone SGBV 
charges, any individual formulation of SGBV in initial charges would have far from guaranteed 
the conviction of Lubanga; there have still been no convictions for rape as a war crime, 16 
years since the court began functioning.  
In 2012, Lubanga was found guilty and convicted of the conscription, recruitment and 
use of child soldiers, and notably with a heavy emphasis and presentation of the SGBV 
elements that were involved in these crimes.150 
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The Bemba SGBV charges did not withstand the scrutiny of the ICC Appeal Chamber, 
however. On 8 June 2018, the Bemba conviction for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
which included rape, under the principle of command responsibility, was overturned by the 
Appeals Chamber.151 The first reason for this was because the Appeals Chamber decided that 
‘the conviction exceeded the charges’ that were initially confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
in 2009.152 The Appeals Chamber held that the criminal acts added after the Confirmation 
Decision was issued did not constitute part of the ‘facts and circumstances described in the 
charges’ and thus Mr Bemba could not be convicted of them.153 This decision was made by the 
Appeals Chamber, despite their acknowledgement that the Trial Chamber is permitted to utilize 
evidence of these same criminal acts ‘for the purposes of the contextual element of crimes 
against humanity.’154 It appears astonishing and counterintuitive that evidence of criminality 
that is allowed to be considered for some aspects of a charge cannot be utilized as evidence of 
a charge in itself.  
Other international legal experts have noted problems with the Appeals decision also; 
Streiff submits that the Appeals Chamber is essentially requiring the Pre-Trial Chamber 
proceedings to become a ‘mini-trial’ placing an unreasonable burden on the OTP to be 
‘absolutely trial-ready’ at the confirmation of charges stage.155 They believe that the Rome 
Statute is being interpreted in a too restrictive manner, demonstrating the remaining ambiguity 
surrounding the statute’s implementation. Whiting states that the confirmation hearing is 
supposed to be a ‘low hurdle, designed to weed out’ cases that clearly lack the basis to 
 
151 Bemba Appeal Judgment, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red, (June 8, 2018). 
152 Bemba Appeal Judgment, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red, (June 8, 2018) at *23; Bemba Charging Decision, 
ICC/01/05-01/08-424, at *[204-05], [310-312]. 
153 Bemba Appeal Judgment, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red, (June 8, 2018) at *[115]. 
154 Bemba Appeal Judgment, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red, (June 8, 2018) at *[117]. 
155 Fritz Streiff, “The Bemba Acquittal: Checks and Balances at the International Criminal Court,” International 
Justice Monitor, July 18, 2018, https://www.ijmonitor.org/2018/07/the-bemba-acquittal-checks-and-balances-at-
the-international-criminal-court/. 
 41 
proceed.156 Pre-Trial Judges need only have ‘substantial grounds to believe’ that the alleged 
crimes were committed by the accused; Whiting notes that this standard falls between the 
‘reasonable grounds to believe’ arrest standard and the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ trial 
standard.157 In other words, it was sufficient to note at the PTC that Bemba was criminally 
responsible for the ‘war crimes and crimes against humanity of murder, rape and pillage by his 
soldiers in CAR from October 26, 2002, until March 15, 2003,’ and not for each and every 
single criminal act that would prove these accusations.158 This change has been deemed 
‘unwarranted and contrary to the aims of achieving justice.159 
The second reason Bemba’s conviction was overturned was because the Appeals 
Chamber concluded that the Trial Chambers made an ‘unrealistic assessment’ as to whether 
Bemba took ‘all the necessary and reasonable measures… to prevent or repress the crimes 
committed by MLC troops.’160 They decided that this decision was ‘tainted by serious errors’ 
because a commander should not be blamed for not having done something they had ‘no power 
to do.’161 Indeed that fact that the MLC was operating abroad placed great difficulties on ‘Mr 
Bemba’s ability, as a remote commander, to take measures’ to prevent or punish his troops’ 
criminality.162 This finding was despite the fact that Bemba had sent these fighters to the CAR 
in the first place.163 
A primary consequence of these findings is that, going forward, there is a severe lack of 
clarity as to the functions of each chamber of the ICC, which threatens the ability of the court 
to prosecute in line with the rule of law. Helen Brady of the OTP notes that ‘there was quite a 
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change to the standard of review of factual findings’ by the Appeals Chamber; unless Trial 
Chamber findings are ‘unreasonable’ you do not ‘disturb’ them, as argued by the Prosecution 
in the appeal.164 She notes that the decision has now also thrown up questions of how the 
Prosecution can bring charges relating to SGBV, how they are to charge, and how to approach 
the question of taking all necessary and reasonable measures.165 The issue was further 
complicated when the Appeals Chamber expressed that their judgment relating to adding 
criminal acts after confirmation would not necessarily always require an amendment to the 
charges and that this question ‘may be left open.’166 
Further, the fact that the outcome essentially led to three different opinions in one which 
creates a ‘fragmentation of law.’167 This is especially frustrating for the prosecutors because, 
as the court is still in its infancy, lack of consensus on these legal questions shows that the court 
is still very much in the process of developing established jurisprudence on some very critical 
issues.168 It is consequently a huge task for both prosecutors and defense teams to build their 
cases when it is so unclear how a single chamber is likely to decide, let alone when there is 
clearly so much disagreement across chambers. Samson does recognize that this is a 
consequence of the fact that an international court does have to appease and facilitate an 
amalgamation of legal systems and approaches.169 ICC judges originate from both common 
law and civil law jurisdictions which are based on different legal philosophies which practice 
different approaches relating to the appropriate procedures for collecting and admitting 
evidence, the value of witness evidence and the value of cross-examination for example. 
Samson explains that this ‘hybrid’ nature of the ICC can at times result in ‘confusions in the 
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courtroom.’170 Powderly and Hayes condemn the fact that none of the Judges in the Bemba 
Appeal addressed how each of their differing ‘conclusions and approaches should be 
interpreted or relied on… in future cases.’171 This legal uncertainty also threatens the court’s 
ability to ensure protection of the rule of law.172 
Notwithstanding the clear issues that the Bemba judgment has thrown up for future ICC 
jurisprudence, these disparities and concerns directly impacted the overall abilities of the court 
to achieve gender justice in this case. Bemba’s initial conviction was ‘heralded’ as ‘historic 
and profoundly significant’ for gender justice and for the recognition of the barbarity of SGBV 
for victims. Yet this new, high standard of review which the Appeals Chamber imposed in 
Bemba facilitated impunity for SGBV. The reality is that there was ‘overwhelming evidence’ 
of SGBV in the CAR conflict and this unreasonably high procedural standard imposed by the 
Appeals Chamber prevented any accountability for these crimes.173 It did not allow for the 
admission of new evidence that so often arises post-confirmation of charges – a situation that 
is very specific to SGBV trials where SGBV victims do not wish to come forward unless totally 
certain that the defendant ‘will actually stand trial,’ especially where they are a senior figure 
within their community.174  
With regards the issue of Bemba’s inabilities to fulfil his responsibilities due to his 
remoteness, Sadat argues that in fact remoteness is not a defendable excuse for a commander’s 
failure to properly exercise control over troops. She suggests in fact that remoteness warrants 
heightened supervision from the commander and a more stringent demonstration of ‘due 
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diligence’ due to the increased risks involved in deploying troops remotely.175 Indeed with the 
increase in use of modern communication methods commanders do have ‘almost immediate’ 
access to lines of communication with their troops anyway.176 The responsibility of a 
commander to take measures against the commission of rape by troops above merely send[ing] 
a letter to an NGO is heightened yet again based on the sheer frequency of its occurrence as a 
tool of war, as previously discussed; the use of SGBV by troops in the CAR was clearly not 
out-with the realm of possibility, and Bemba should have pre-emptively implemented internal 
measures to prevent it.177 An alternative outcome regarding Bemba’s responsibilities as a 
military commander would not only have been desirable in the Bemba case, but would also 
have sent a particularly desirable message and precedent in the constantly evolving climate of 
international conflict today; that commanders will not be shielded from SGBV criminality 
purely due to geographical remoteness.178  
As an aside, a total eight out of the eleven judges that heard and decided in this case 
concluded that Bemba was ‘guilty beyond reasonable doubt,’ representing a clear majority of 
ICC judges.179 This does show some coherence in legal arbitration at the ICC. Nonetheless, 
Oosterveld does recommend that the ‘next step’ for all of the international tribunals is to ensure 
‘gender-sensitive judging.’ She believes that as a larger group of arbiters of international 
justice, ‘we are not necessarily there yet’ and a greater level of coordination is required.180 She 
notes that some of these discrepancies highlighted above might be avoided where judges are 
collectively trained specifically for judging at the international level to ensure more coherence 
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and understanding in the application of international criminal laws and especially those relating 
to SGBV. She highlights the successes of forms of judicial training at the domestic level in 
Canada and how this could be rolled out on a wider level. It is important to ensure that judges 
are kept informed on evolving perspectives relating to gender issues and can thus apply a ‘better 
analysis of gender issues’ in the courtroom.181 Indeed increasing the number of female judges 
serving in the Chambers could also improve the court’s propensity towards gender-sensitive 
judging.182 
Another issue that academics have highlighted in Bemba that arguably impacted the 
pursuit of gender justice relates to the PTC’s rejection of cumulative charging at the 
confirmation of charges stage. The PTC ascertained that material elements of torture and 
outrages upon personal dignity were elements of rape and thus were subsumed by the rape 
charges.183 By doing so, they ‘failed to recognize the distinctive harms of rape, torture and 
outrages upon personal dignity.’184 O’Regan emphasizes that subsuming these distinct 
elements into one crime shows a lack of insight into the intricacies of each of their harms and 
effects; the trauma stemming from ‘witnessing the torture or suffering of family members’ for 
example is unique from the damage personally suffered by sexual assault victims.185 The PTC 
failed to acknowledge that the harms that result from each of these acts are distinct, and thus 
the full breadth of criminality, which was a missed opportunity for utilizing the law’s 
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The Larger Question of Gender Justice and Where to Go from Here 
There is a clear irony in the outcomes of these two cases. SGBV was included in the 
Bemba initial indictments yet he was acquitted and the judgment has raised some clear 
obstacles for seeking gender justice in future cases. SGBV was not included in the Lubanga 
initial indictments yet he was convicted of child-soldier-related charges, with a heavy emphasis 
on the SGBV aspect of these crimes.   
In comparing the success of these cases we of course must consider what gender justice 
really is. Is justice incarcerating a criminal, or providing solace to that criminal’s victims? 
These are in fact very different situations; one prioritizing the outcome of the criminal, the 
other prioritizing the outcome for the victim.  
If we consider justice as the former, then arguably Lubanga was a success in terms of 
gender justice; the perpetrator of criminal wrongs, including SGBV, was found guilty and 
sentenced to 14 years in prison. Although he was found to be indigent and thus unable to pay 
compensation to victims, his general criminality was punished through incarceration.187 
Perhaps the innovation of placing sexual violence firmly within the context of a different crime 
in Lubanga was in fact a sensible middle ground for the OTP to take, at least until the other 
chambers of the ICC catch up to the progressive stance required to actually convict those in 
positions of command for the SGBV committed by their subordinates. And, in many ways, the 
OTP should be commended for listening to the security risks of the victims who were testifying, 
and for taking a step back when victims were facing dangers throughout investigation (which 
was touched on in Chapter 4.) 
Others would argue we must consider justice as the latter, and the fact that Bemba was 
overturned is not so important as the fact that criminal charges specifically for SGBV were 
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represented in their own right, debated, discussed, given time and consideration, and the full 
extent of the victims’ suffering was presented within charges. This ties back to O’Regan’s 
notions of legal expressivism, for example. This outcome did mean that victims of course were 
not able to benefit from reparations paid by Bemba or see him incarcerated for his actions.  
This paper would in fact assert that the goal of the ICC is to achieve accountability for 
violations, and thus the outcome of Lubanga was surprisingly preferable in terms of seeking 
gender justice. It is nearly impossible for the ICC to pursue all the aims that have over time 
become associated with it at the same time; these include ‘justice’, ‘accountability’, ‘peace-
building’ and the ‘alleviation of victims suffering.’188 As such, the court must be more realistic 
as to what it can and cannot achieve.189 Numerous scholars and practitioners note that fighting 
the ‘impunity gap’ and gaining ‘accountability’ should be its top priority.190 By failing to more 
accurately and narrowly define its realistic goals, undesirable compromise inevitably results in 
the case outcomes. This is clearly exemplified in both Lubanga and Bemba where overall, it 
seems that essentially neither outcome condemned the full extent of the both criminals’ illegal 
actions, and neither outcome required the criminals to pay remedy to their victims in a 
monetary sense.  
This paper would also argue that the Lubanga outcome would also provide more of a 
deterrence factor to potential future perpetrators. It would be extremely hard to measure 
whether awareness of sexual violence was advanced more across communities by Bemba going 
to trial for SGBV committed in the CAR, albeit unsuccessfully, or by the successful conviction 
of Lubanga for his conscription and use of child soldiers which heavily involved SGBV. 
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However, when we consider that Bemba returned to the DRC and was considering running for 
a Presidency in the DRC shortly after his acquittal, with immense support from his countrymen 
(now deemed ineligible for unrelated reasons), and contrast that to Lubanga’s position as a 
prisoner incarcerated by the ICC for use and abuse of child soldiers, there is a strong case that 
the outcome of Lubanga was more valuable in terms of educating the world that imposing 
regimes of devastation, suffering and sexual violence on communities will not go unpunished. 
This can only be beneficial to the pursuit of gender justice.191  
Indeed, evidence shows that there is a limit as to the scope of reparations that can be 
awarded by the court to victims anyway; Melinda Reed noted that by tying reparations 
specifically to orders of the court actually limits the reach of reparations significantly.192 As 
the ICC cases focus on crimes committed by a specific person, in a specific time frame, in a 
specific geographical area, those eligible for reparations represent ‘the tiniest little piece of a 
giant puzzle.’193 Furthermore, the Trust Fund for Victims, although beneficial is still tied to the 
criminal proceedings and thus also has a limited capacity for helping victims.194 As Reed noted, 
the Trust Fund for Victim’s assistance mandate is not big enough to address the situation in 
CAR, let alone all of the many situations before it.195 Largely, this is due to the fund’s lack of 
resources (particularly strained when a convicted criminal is deemed as indigent and the fund 
is forced to take this burden.) As reiterated by Reed, the reparations mechanism of the ICC will 
probably not satisfy many of the needs of victims anyway.196  
By pursuing prosecutorial strategies which focus heavily on a narrow range of crimes, 
prioritize speed and efficiency of investigations and still bring in gendered aspects where there 
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is evidence to do so (as in Lubanga,) we could ensure at least criminal accountability at the 
international level while other bodies can then prioritize the needs of SGBV survivors where 
the hard law has been unable to. Space can then be opened up for the prioritization of victims’ 
needs through the creation of bodies separate from the court’s outcomes, to more fully cater to 
the extremely wide victim pools resulting from these vast breaches of human rights. Alternative 
routes prioritizing victims’ justice could come in the form of increased use of Peace 
Commissions. Increased support could be given to the plethora of organizations that already 
work at the local level to implement community-level rebuilding projects and that prioritize 
recognition of the suffering of victims; these can go a long way to providing personal 
contentment within victims. These could be in the form of commemorative statues and benches 
within communities, and benefit a larger community affected as opposed to just one specific 
classification of victims. There is a plethora of actors – including NGOs, think-tanks, 
academics, local governments and the UN – with mechanisms ready to prioritize victims and 
work across the current ‘silos and divides’; the international community should look to 
strengthening them to serve victims’ needs.197  
This strategy is only favorable for gender justice however if there remains a concerted 
effort by the OTP to present evidence of SGBV wherever it exists in all trials, to ensure that 
SGBV is still thoroughly represented. It would be hoped that as the Trial and Appeal Chamber 
judges will become increasingly exposed to discussion of this type of criminality, they will 
gain a deeper understanding of its severity and eventually existing archaic SGBV-related 
perceptions can be progressed. Although this is not a desirable solution long-term – with the 
hope that SGBV charges will increasingly receive the gender-sensitive judging they deserve 
through their continued presentation at trial by the OPT and eventually the OTP can bring them 
in their own right – this could allow at the very least for justice to be achieved in every case in 
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the interim while the ICC gains legitimacy, coherence, and reaches internal agreement on each 


























This paper has sought to gain a crucial understanding of how the developments over the 
last 50-100 years have shaped the prosecution strategies of the OTP regarding SGBV today.  
The Rome Statute was viewed as an improvement on pre-Ad Hoc Tribunal legislation 
with regards terminology, but nonetheless compromises made during the drafting of the Rome 
Statute are still posing problems today. We saw that the ambiguous definition of the term 
‘gender’ led to resistance towards its inclusion in early OTP indictments. While linguistic 
clarifications were instigated by Bensouda more recently, the delay reduced the court’s ability 
to pursue gender justice in its first 10 years of functioning. Indeed ambiguities within by the 
Rome Statute regarding the roles of the distinct chambers have already proved difficult to 
interpret in practice, and have only been further distorted by the recent Bemba case. 
Furthermore, while the Rome Statute’s wide incorporation of SGBV crimes was commended 
as progress based on ICTY and ICTR experiences, the Statute’s implementation by the ICC 
still takes a narrow lens; for example, the PTC’s refusal to allow cumulative charging regarding 
rape, torture and outrages on personal dignity still displays a lack of understanding of the 
intricacies of SGBV and therefore impedes efforts to achieve gender justice. With all of these 
complications considered in the Bemba and Lubanga cases, it is apparent that the Rome Statute 
is, as it is currently interpreted, not yet capable of providing the fullest extent of gender justice 
possible for the most severe breaches of international human rights obligations.  
Additionally, it has come to light that until these drawbacks are rectified throughout the 
entire court, the OTP has to be particularly calculated in its strategy when deciding the charges 
it chooses to bring. The OTP must consider the realities of SGBV perceptions by the judges 
who are going to decide case outcomes. Even in a case like Bemba where the lead prosecutor 
prioritized a gender lens within charges, the OTP brought a wide range of SGBV crimes, and 
the OTP had adequate time to investigate Bemba before his arrest, a conviction for SGBV was 
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still unsuccessful. Conversely, in Lubanga, where none of the aforementioned criteria was 
fulfilled, a conviction for crimes heavily rooted in SGBV was successful. It therefore does not 
follow that initial inclusion in indictments automatically results in gender justice.  
Thus, although the initial hypothesis for this paper was that the OTP should adopt a 
prosecutorial strategy that incorporates charges of SGBV in any and all cases in which they 
occur, the author would conclude that in fact this will not be the most effective strategy of 
prosecution in the current climate where gender-sensitive judging does not yet fully exist, ICC 
conviction rates for SGBV crimes remain low, and evidence collection for these crimes still 
poses great risks to victims. To ensure gender justice, the OTP must adopt a strategy that is 
narrow, ensures investigations are swift, and prioritizes SGBV criminality but also embeds it 
into other crimes where possible to ensure convictions. As mentioned above, although this is 
certainly by no means a preferable strategy considering the expressivist aspect of the law, at 
the very least justice (by our definition of justice as accountability) would be more consistently 
achieved. This strategy at least should persist in the coming years as social perceptions of 
SGBV slowly catch up with the law, just as it did in the 20th century. Once this is achieved, the 
other chambers should fully commit to pursuing gender justice and stand-alone SGBV charges 
will more likely withstand their scrutiny, or indeed at least be considered within sentencing 
decisions. In the meantime, victim’s justice should be prioritized through avenues that do not 
tie reparations and aid directly to legal outcomes but instead outsource it to organizations with 
the existing experience, capacity, resources and understanding to truly fulfil all of the needs of 
all victims to the larger atrocity that occurred – not just victims of the crimes for which the 
specific defendant on trial is responsible.  
In order to continue to put this pressure on the other chambers to conduct gender-
sensitive judging, we must look to the pursuit of gender justice more broadly. Current 
initiatives being explored by the WIGJ for example seek to focus on the basis of the principle 
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of complementarity; by seeking to strengthen the pursuit of gender justice in local and domestic 
systems, this will hopefully reflect in the outlook of these same judges at the international level 
(ICC judges are put forward by their respective countries.)198 Or indeed, prioritizing an effort 
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